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Abstract	
This	 study	 of	 English	 Coronial	 practice	 raises	 a	 number	 of	 questions	 about	 the	 role	
played	by	the	Coroner	within	contemporary	governance.	Following	observations	at	over	
20	 inquests	 into	 possible	 suicides	 and	 in‐depth	 interviews	 with	 six	 Coroners,	 three	
preliminary	issue	emerged,	all	of	which	pointed	to	a	broader	and,	in	many	ways,	more	
significant	 issue.	 These	 preliminary	 issues	 are	 concerned	 with	 (1)	 the	 existence	 of	
considerable	 slippages	between	different	Coroners	over	which	deaths	 are	 likely	 to	be	
classified	 as	 suicide;	 (2)	 the	 high	 standard	 of	 proof	 required	 and	 immense	 pressure	
faced	 by	 Coroners	 from	 family	 members	 at	 inquest	 to	 reach	 any	 verdict	 other	 than	
suicide,	which	significantly	depresses	 likely	suicide	 rates;	and	 (3)	Coroners	 feeling	no	
professional	 obligation,	 either	 individually	 or	 collectively,	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	
production	 of	 consistent	 and	 useful	 social	 data	 regarding	 suicide,	 arguably	 rendering	
comparative	 suicide	 statistics	 relatively	worthless.	These	 concerns	 lead,	ultimately,	 to	
the	second	more	important	question	about	the	role	expected	of	Coroners	within	social	
governance	and	within	an	effective,	contemporary	democracy.	That	is,	are	Coroners	the	
principal	officers	in	the	public	administration	of	death;	or	are	they,	first	and	foremost,	a	
crucial	 part	 of	 the	 grieving	 process,	 one	 that	 provides	 important	 therapeutic	
interventions	into	the	mental	and	emotional	health	of	the	community?		
	
Introduction:	The	coronial	gate‐keeping	of	suicide	statistics	
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Much	is	often	made	of	changes	over	time	in	our	published	suicide	rates.	As	a	society,	we	
are	 relieved	 when	 we	 are	 informed	 that	 fewer	 people	 are	 ending	 their	 own	 lives	
(Australian	Bureau	of	Statistics	2012),	confused	when	we	are	told	exactly	the	opposite	
(Haesler	2010),	 and	 concerned	when	our	own	 rates	 are	 compared	unfavourably	with	
other	nations	and	peoples	(Georgatos	2013).	It	is	often	difficult	to	ascertain	the	precise	
trajectory	of	our	suicide	rates,	let	alone	where	we	stand	in	relation	to	anyone	else.		
	
The	 difficulty	 here	 is	 that	 suicide	 statistics	 are	 notoriously	 unreliable,	 with	 most	
research	 in	 the	 area	 suggesting	 that	 alternative	 ways	 of	 counting,	 classifying,	 and	
reporting	would	lead	to	significantly	higher	rates	of	suicide	(Harrison,	Abou	Elnour	and	
Pointer	 2009).	 This	 systemic	 under‐counting	may	 be	 for	 a	 range	 of	 reasons.	Walker,	
Chen	and	Madden	(2008)	contend	that	factors	such	as	disparities	between	jurisdictions,	
lack	 of	 standardisation	 in	 the	 reporting	 of	 Coronial	 deaths,	 and	 issues	 over	 forms	 for	
police	 reports	 put	 a	 particular	 slant	 on	 the	data.	 They	 also	 point	 to	 the	 reluctance	 of	
some	Coroners	to	reach	a	finding	of	suicide	in	the	first	place.	It	 is	this	final	factor	that	
constitutes	the	central	problematic	of	this	paper.	After	all,	if	Coroners	are	reticent	about	
reaching	suicide	verdicts,	what	are	they	there	for?	Why	bother	with	suicide	inquests	at	
all?		
	
From	the	inception	of	the	role	in	the	eleventh	century,	one	of	the	central	responsibilities	
of	 the	Coroner	has	been	 to	 investigate	deaths	 ‘considered	worthy	of	 inquiry’	 (Burney	
2000:	3).	This	would	 include	deaths	such	as	 those	by	accident,	where	there	was	some	
suspicion	of	wrongdoing,	and	those	by	suicide.	This	eventually	became	seen	as	a	largely	
administrative	task,	conducted	in	a	non‐adversarial	environment,	as	part	of	the	effective	
administration	of	the	populace.		
	
However,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 recording,	 assessing	 and	 categorising	 of	 death,	 the	
Coroner’s	role	has	more	recently	expanded,	throughout	all	Commonwealth	countries,	to	
incorporate	 elements	 of	 social	 management	 and	 prevention	 of	 harm	 (The	 Victorian	
Institute	of	Forensic	Medicine	2013)		
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Much	of	the	operation	of	the	office	of	Coroner	or	Coroners	courts	in	Australia	is	centered	on	
injury	and	death	prevention,	with	 the	Coroner	empowered	to	make	recommendations	on	
matters	of	public	health	and	safety	and	judicial	administration.	
	
Consequently,	the	Coroner	is	not	only	an	essential	part	of	our	legal	system	in	that	they	
manage	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 State	 and	 the	 death	 of	 its	 citizens	 and,	 in	
particular,	 those	 deaths	 deemed	 to	 warrant	 investigation;	 now	 they	 are	 also	 an	
important	element	of	the	process	by	which	the	State	accumulates	social	data	which	are	
used	to	identify	problems	and	shape	policy.	The	difficulty	here	is	clear:	if	Coroners	are	
reluctant	 to	 reach	 a	 finding	 of	 suicide,	 as	Walker,	 Chen	 and	Madden	 (2008)	 contend,	
then	their	role	in	production	of	suicide	statistics,	which	in	turn	direct	social	policies	and	
programs	(targeting,	for	example,	suicide	prevention),	becomes	problematic.		
	
In	 addition	 to	 these	 two	 roles	 –	 death	 investigation	 and	 social	 management	 –	 this	
research	suggests	that	there	is	a	third	function,	one	which	may	often	sit	at	odds	with	the	
first	two.	As	Coroner	3	states	in	this	research:		
	
It’s all about enabling people  to get on with  their  lives … giving  them closure, actually  lifting 
them up and explaining things … it’s not what the law tells us it’s about, but that’s the reality of 
what it should do … 
	
That	 is,	 Coroners	 have	 been	 allocated	 or,	 perhaps	 more	 accurately,	 have	 allocated	
themselves	a	role	in	the	process	of	giving	closure	to	grieving	families.	This	‘therapeutic’	
role	may	often	result	 in	Coroners	managing	 inquests	 in	ways	 that	go	well	beyond	 the	
simple	 finding	 of	 facts,	 and	 which	 has	 significant	 implications	 for	 the	 administrative	
elements	of	the	task.		
	
Democracy	and	the	Coronial	inquest	
	
This	research	investigates	the	English	Coronial	Inquest	system,	particularly	as	it	relates	
to	 the	 investigation	of	potential	suicides.	 In	doing	so,	 it	also	makes	some	comparisons	
with	 how	 similar	 deaths	 are	managed	 in	 Australia.	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 important	
differences	between	the	two	systems.	The	most	significant	concerns	the	role	played	by	
the	 inquest.	 In	 England,	 all	 deaths	 that	 are	 considered	 worthy	 of	 inquiry	 –	 which	
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includes	potential	suicides	–	are	necessarily	the	subject	of	a	public	inquest.	In	Australia,	
the	 same	deaths	are	assessed	 solely	on	 the	basis	of	 the	documentary	evidence	unless	
specific	circumstances	dictate	otherwise.		
	
It	 is	 important	to	note	that	the	role	of	the	Coroner	and	the	functioning	of	the	Coronial	
inquest	are	not	 just	matters	of	abstract	social	and	administrative	 interest.	 It	has	been	
argued	that,	historically,	both	are	central	to	how	English	democracy	came	to	be	shaped	
and	understood	and,	as	such,	questions	about	how	well	the	Coronial	system	works,	and	
about	how	different	former	British	colonies	have	chosen	to	refract	this	original	office	for	
their	 own	 purposes,	 continue	 to	 be	 asked.	 	 In	 Bodies	 of	 Evidence,	 Burney	 (2000)	
examines	the	historical	role	played	by	the	public	inquest	in	placing	important	checks	on	
State	abuse	of	power,	by	insisting	that	all	prison	deaths	–	and	most	famously,	the	deaths	
of	 18	 protesting	 workers	 killed	 by	 in	 the	 Peterloo	 Massacre	 in	 1819	 –	 face	 public	
scrutiny	 and	 judgment.	 This	 notion	 that	 questionable	 deaths	 be	 the	 subject	 of	 public	
investigation,	 an	 investigation	 accessible	 to	 and	 readily	 understood	 by	 all	 interested	
parties	 within	 the	 community,	 became	 central	 to	 English	 conceptions	 of	 justice	 and	
democracy.	 Indeed,	much	 of	 Burney’s	 book	 examines	 the	 complex	 tension	 that	 arose	
within	 the	Coronial	 inquest	between	 the	voices	of	 this	participatory	 tradition	and	 the	
bearers	 of	 new,	 scientific	 knowledge	 that	 sought	 to	 bring	 medical	 expertise	 to	 the	
inquest	process,	often	at	the	expense	of	public	understanding	and	involvement.	
	
…	 the	benefit	of	expert	governance,	particularly	 in	an	era	of	mass	democracy,	was	 that	 it	
could	 draw	upon	 advanced,	 universalizing	 knowledge	 in	 the	 service	 of	 public	well‐being	
and,	ultimately,	public	education.	Its	shortcomings,	however,	lay	in	its	tendency	to	stifle	the	
very	instruments	of	civic	education	–	the	local,	participatory	institutions	in	which	an	active,	
informed,	and	morally	elevated	citizenry	was	forged.	(Burney	2000:	9)		
		
Arguably,	this	tension	–	or	at	least	a	modern	variant	on	it	(that	is,	between	medicine	and	
the	law)	–	can	still	be	clearly	seen	within	the	fabric	of	contemporary	death	investigation	
(Carpenter	 and	 Tait	 2010).	 Certainly	 there	 was	 some	 expectation	 that	 this	 tension	
would	 be	 evidenced	within	 this	 study,	 and	 there	were	 some	minor	 examples	 of	 this.	
However,	 what	 was	 uncovered	 was	 a	 far	 more	 significant	 tension	 between	 the	
governmental	and	the	pastoral	functions	of	the	Coroner,	between	what	appears	to	be	an	
investigative	and	preventative	role	–	investigative	in	delivering	an	appropriate	finding;	
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and	 preventative	 in	 contributing	 the	 necessary	 data	 to	 inform	 social	 policy	 –	 and	 a	
therapeutic	role	–	 in	 looking	after	 the	well‐being	of	bereaved	 families.	This	paper	will	
address	this	specific	issue	in	some	detail.		
	
Coronial	inquests	and	interviews	
	
This	 study	 was	 conducted	 within	 one	 geographic	 area	 in	 England.	 The	 Research	
consisted	 of	 observations	made	 at	 public	 inquests	 into	 possible	 suicides,	 followed	 by	
interviews	with	six	of	the	coroners	who	had	presided	over	the	above	inquests.i	
	
From	the	observations	made	at	inquests,	three	relevant	conclusions	were	drawnii.	First,	
there	appears	 to	be	no	 single	model	 for	 running	a	Coronial	 inquest.	 Far	 from	being	a	
uniform	and	consistent	element	of	the	English	legal	system,	the	Coronial	inquest	takes	a	
wide	range	of	different	forms.	Though	the	Coroners	are	uniformly	professional,	patient	
and	 skilled	 at	managing	 grieving	 families,	 each	 Coroner	 seems	 to	 organise	 their	 own	
courtrooms	as	they	see	fit.	For	example,	some	Coroners	focused	largely	on	testimony	of	
the	 police	 and	 the	 bereaved	 family;	 others	 placed	 greater	 emphasis	 on	 the	 available	
scientific	 evidence;	 some	 appeared	 to	 prefer	 a	 brief	 inquest,	 focused	 on	 reaching	 a	
finding	 as	 quickly	 as	 possible;	 others	 appeared	willing	 to	 allow	 anyone	who	 felt	 they	
had	something	to	contribute	the	possibility	of	doing	so	if	they	wished.		
	
Second,	to	be	able	to	reach	a	finding	of	suicide,	the	standard	of	proof	is	extremely	high.	
In	 England,	 suicide	 determination	 is	 based	 around	 the	 criminal	 standard	 of	 ‘beyond	
reasonable	doubt’,	whereas	the	Australian	model	has	adopted	the	civil	standard	of	 ‘on	
the	balance	of	probabilities’.	On	the	basis	of	the	observations	made	at	the	20	inquests,	
the	required	standard	of	 ‘beyond	a	reasonable	doubt’,	as	deployed	within	the	Coronial	
inquest,	appears	an	exceptionally	difficult	level	to	attain.		
	
Finally,	 the	 Coroners	 are	 often	 placed	 under	 significant	 pressure	 throughout	 the	
proceedings	 by	 the	 deceased’s	 family	 not	 to	 bring	 in	 a	 finding	 of	 suicide.	 Almost	 all	
inquests	are	attended	by	family	members	and,	even	where	the	Coroners	appear	inclined	
to	accept	a	finding	of	suicide,	attempts	are	still	continually	made	to	control	the	general	
narrative.	These	efforts	at	control	extended	beyond	the	Coroner	to	courtroom	staff,	 to	
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any	 newspaper	 reporters	 present,	 and	 to	 anyone	 else	 present	 at	 the	 proceedings,	
including	Australian	academic	researchers.		
	
However,	from	the	semi‐structured	interviews	conducted	with	Coroners,	three	further	
issues	emerged	which	are	not	only	tied	to	the	above	observations	but	which	also	raise	
some	important	questions	about	just	what	is	going	on	in	Coronial	suicide	investigations.	
Having	set	the	groundwork	by	addressing	these	three	issues,	 the	subsequent	question	
about	the	governmental	role	of	 the	Coroner	and	the	degree	to	which	this	role	extends	
beyond	the	administrative	into	the	therapeutic,	can	be	addressed.		
	
1.	 	Inconsistency	between	Coroners	
Firstly,	 there	 exist	 considerable	 slippages	 between	 different	 Coroners	 as	 to	 what	 is	
likely	 to	 be	 considered	 suicide,	 and	 what	 is	 not.	 There	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 a	 number	 of	
reasons	 for	 this.	 As	 mentioned	 previously,	 there	 has	 always	 been	 tension	 within	
Coronial	 death	 investigations	 between	 those	 who	 regard	 the	 process	 as	 a	 useful	
application	of	the	scientific	quest	for	truth	–	often	exemplified	by	a	different	approach	to	
the	use	of	invasive	autopsy	–	and	those	who	place	far	more	weight	upon	legal	processes	
and	information	gathered	at	the	scene	of	death.	This	tension	extends	to	disagreement	of	
who	should,	and	who	should	not,	be	eligible	to	be	a	Coroner:		
	
I	have	nothing	against	my	medical	colleagues,	but	I	do	think	it’s	a	job	for	a	lawyer	…	I	think	that	
Inquest	law	is	now	becoming	so	complex	–	it’s	nothing	to	do	with	intellectual	ability,	but	I	think	
you	need	legal	training,	and	to	have	performed	in	the	court	system	to	really	be	able	to	deal	with	
it.	Coroner	4	
	
A	 further	 reason	 for	 a	 seeming	 lack	 of	 consistency	 in	 reaching	 findings	 of	 suicide	
involves	 considerable	 differences	 in	 levels	 of	 experience,	 in	 that	 more	 practiced	
Coroners	are	often	able	to	better	manage	the	complexities	of	procedure,	evidence	and	
family	management	than	are	those	with	less	time	in	the	position.	That	said,	additional	
experience	 does	 not	 necessarily	 translate	 into	 having	 the	 confidence	 to	 bring	 in	 a	
difficult	finding	of	suicide;		–	in	fact,	often	the	reverse	is	apparent:		
 
The	newer	coroners	are	probably	more	likely	to	bring	in	a	suicide	verdict	than	the	older	ones	
…	well	 I	 think	 it’s	because	the	older	ones	–	suicide	probably	had	more	of	a	stigma	in	those	
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days	 and	 there	 were	 some	 Coroners	 who	 will	 go	 to	 almost	 any	 lengths	 not	 to	 bring	 in	 a	
suicide	verdict.	Coroner	1	
	
In	addition	 to	 the	 issue	of	experience,	ability	 in	 the	role	of	 the	Coroner	and	disparate	
levels	 of	 training	 are	 also	 issues.	 In	 England,	 there	 is	 no	 centralised,	 standardising	
Coronial	Service	that	might	provide	training	and	guidance.	Coroners	are	pretty	much	on	
their	own:		
	
When	 I	 started,	 there	 was	 no	 training	 whatsoever	 for	 Coroners	 …	 the	 Coroner	 Society	 of	
England	and	Wales	established	 some	 training	 for	Coroners;	 it	was	pretty	 limited	with	a	very	
small	budget.	There’s	no	requirement	for	us	to	have	that	training	…	so	there	is	inevitably	a	lack	
of	consistency,	and	there	are	some	people	who	do	not	go	on	any	training	at	all.	Coroner	2	
	
There	 are	 also	 variations	 in	 funding	 and	 responsibilities.	 Some	 Coroners	 are	 well‐
funded	and	well‐resourced;	others	 are	not,	which	affects	 their	 ability	 to	 complete	 the	
work	effectively	and	consistently:	
	
You	go	and	see	Coroners	in	some	other	parts	of	the	country	and	they’re	working	out	of	the	back	
kitchen,	 they’re	working	 out	 of	 a	 Portacabin	…	 there	was	 one	 Coroner	 starting	 to	 hold	 an	
inquest,	could	only	have	the	village	hall	 for	the	day,	had	to	move	to	the	next	town	to	actually	
conclude	the	inquest.	Coroner	3	
	 	
While	 these	 are	 interesting	 and	 relevant	 in	 their	 own	 right,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	
paper,	 one	 final	 reason	 for	 significant	 slippages	 between	 Coroners	 over	 findings	 of	
suicide	 is	perhaps	more	 important	 and	more	 telling	 than	 the	others.	This	 is	 apparent	
differences	of	opinion	over	the	central	role	of	the	Coroner.	Some	Coroners	take	a	fairly	
hard	 line	 over	 their	 determinations	 –	 understanding	 their	 role	 as	 fundamentally	
administrative	–	while	others	see	their	role	in	a	more	pastoral	light,	pertaining	first	and	
foremost	to	helping	the	grieving	family.		
	
I’m	not	a	social	service.	I’m	supposed	to	be	making	an	inquiry	on	behalf	of	the	State,	not	on	
behalf	of	the	family,	and	if	this	person	has	taken	their	own	life,	and	the	evidence	satisfies	me	
beyond	a	 reasonable	doubt	 that	 this	 is	 the	case,	what	verdict	 can	 I	possibly	come	 to	other	
that	that	they	have	taken	their	own	life?	Coroner	6	
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This	can	be	directly	contrasted	with:	
	
I	 often	 engage	 the	 family	 and	 will	 say,	 ‘I’m	 thinking	 along	 these	 lines.	What’s	 your	 view?’	
Sometimes	if	you	carry	the	families	with	you,	it’s	more	cathartic	–	it’s	totally	wrong,	but	it’s	a	
more	cathartic	experience	for	them	…	you	put	the	family	at	the	heart	of	the	inquiry.	Coroner	4		
	
It’s	all	about	enabling	people	to	get	on	with	their	 lives	…	giving	them	closure,	actually	 lifting	
them	up	and	explaining	things	…	it’s	not	what	the	law	tells	us	it’s	about,	but	that’s	the	reality	of	
what	it	should	do	…	Coroner	3	
	
2.	 	Underestimating	rates	of	suicide	
The	second	issue	to	emerge	from	the	interviews	involves	the	general	admission	by	the	
Coroners	 that	 the	 Coronial	 inquest	 process	 acts	 to	 depress	 suicide	 rates,	 with	 this	
observation	supported	by	most	research	in	the	area	(Harrison	et	al.	2009;	Walker	et	al.	
2008).	 The	 Coroners	 note	 that	 the	 standard	 of	 proof	 is	 at	 the	 very	 highest	 end	 of	
‘beyond	 reasonable	 doubt’.	 That	 is,	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘beyond	 reasonable	 doubt’	 is	 not	 a	
singular	measure;	 it	 is	 a	 continuum,	with	 the	 finding	of	 suicide	placed	 at	 the	 furthest	
end.		
	
The	 standard	 of	 proof	 of	 beyond	 a	 reasonable	 doubt	 as	 applied	 in	 the	 public	 prosecution	
services	is	quite	a	lot	lower	really	…	I	doubt	many	people	would	be	prosecuted	if	you	needed	
the	level	of	sureness	you	need	for	a	suicide	verdict	…	Don’t	misunderstand	that	there’s	only	
one	standard	of	proof,	which	is	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt,	but	then	of	course	it’s	up	to	you	
to	interpret	what’s	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.	Coroner	1	
	
Consequently,	 findings	 of	 suicide	 can	 be	 relatively	 hard	 to	 attain,	 which	 means	 that	
many	 suicides	 are	 classified	 as	 something	 else,	 even	 when	most	 impartial	 observers	
might	 have	 reasonably	 concluded	 death	 by	 suicide.	 This	 results	 in	 a	 significant	
reduction	in	the	numbers	of	suicides	recorded	each	year.		
	
Every	Coroner	does	things	differently,	and	like	I	say,	a	rough	rule	of	thumb	–	if	you’re	looking	
at	statistics,	I	can	guarantee	that	suicide	is	under‐represented.	Roughly,	I	say	you	could	add	a	
third	onto	the	figure	…	Coroner	4	
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We’re	left	with	about	300	cases	a	year	which	we	inquest	…	I	would	say	we	do	50	suicides	a	
year	out	of	300	–	genuine	suicide	verdicts.	Then	there	are	probably	about	another	30	odd,	
which	probably	are.	Coroner	1	
	
This	 institutional	 underestimation	 of	 suicides	 is	 not	 solely	 a	 function	 of	 an	 insistence	
upon	 a	 criminal	 standard	 of	 proof	 for	 reaching	 such	 a	 determination.	 From	 the	
observations	 made	 at	 the	 inquests	 and	 from	 the	 statements	 made	 by	 the	 Coroners	
during	 interview,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 family	 –	 for	 the	 most	 part,	
continually	 lobbying	 for	 any	 finding	 other	 than	 suicide	 –	 also	 acts	 to	 depress	 suicide	
rates.	 Historically,	 the	 desperation	 of	 the	 family	 not	 to	 have	 a	 suicide	 finding	 by	 the	
coroner	is	understandable:		
	
If	you	go	back	in	English	law	150	years	or	so,	suicide	was	an	absolutely	dreadful	thing	to	do	
to	yourself.	You	were	cheating	on	God;	you	would	not	have	any	hope	of	 resurrection	…	At	
that	 stage	 Coroners	 had	 been	 giving	 burial	 orders	 which	 said	 that	 the	 deceased	 must	 be	
buried	at	the	junction	of	four	roads	with	a	stake	through	their	body	–	and	no,	I’m	not	getting	
mixed	up	with	Transylvania	here,	this	is	really	what	it	said	–	where	beggars	could	spit	upon	
their	graves	as	they	went	past.	Coroner	5	
	
Some	Coroners	profess	relative	immunity	to	the	wishes	of	family	members.	While	they	
are	aware	that	the	grieving	family	will	often	engage	in	both	overt	and	covert	attempts	to	
sway	their	opinion	and	hence	the	finding	of	the	inquest,	they	adopt	the	standard	stated	
approach:	that	the	role	of	Coroner	is	primarily	about	reaching	a	legitimate	finding	as	to	
the	cause	and	circumstances	of	death.		
	
A	Coroner	has	to	divorce	his	own	sensibilities	from	his	legal	responsibilities.	Coroner	5	
	
It	boils	down	 to	evidence	as	 far	as	 I’m	concerned.	 It	boils	down	 to	evidence,	and	 if	 there’s	
doubt	…	I	wouldn’t	be	persuaded	just	because	they’re	all	shouting	[the	family]	…	I’m	afraid	
you’ve	just	got	to	be	robust	about	it	and	stick	by	your	guns.	Coroner	2	
	
In	 contrast,	 other	 Coroners	 are	 aware	 that	 such	 wishes	 will	 often	 factor	 into	 their	
overall	 decision‐making	 process.	 That	 is,	 they	 appear	 to	 consider	 that	 taking	 into	
account	family	wishes	is	a	valid	component	of	reaching	an	appropriate	finding.		
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I	 think	a	 lot	of	Coroners	–	me	included	–	sometimes	take	a	sympathetic	view	of	 the	 family,	
and	perhaps,	well,	 you	know	…	why	 leave	 the	 family	with	 the	stigma	of	 this,	when	we	can	
actually	make	their	situation	better?	…	So,	I	think	Coroners,	to	some	extent,	are	softies,	and	
might	not	necessarily	bite	the	bullet	and	say,	yes,	this	is	suicide.	Coroner	4	
	
They	 tend	 to	 come	 in	 numbers.	 If	 you’ve	 got	 10	 members	 of	 the	 family	 with	 their	 eyes	
burning	on	you,	and	they	really	don’t	want	that	verdict,	it	is	very,	very	hard	…	Coroner	4	
	
Clearly,	there	is	division	between	those	Coroners	for	whom	the	job	remains	steadfastly	
administrative,	and	those	who	see	their	principal	task	as	providing	comfort	and	closure	
to	 grieving	 families.	 Indeed,	 advocates	 of	 the	 administrative	 approach	 to	 Coronial	
practice	 often	 have	 little	 time	 for	 those	 who	 seem	 prepared	 to	 be	 swayed	 by	 the	
influence	 of	 the	 family.	 They	 consider	 that	 Coroners	 have	 a	 clearly‐defined	 task	 to	
accomplish,	and	criticise	those	who	shy	away	from	the	tougher	elements	of	that	task.		
 
They’re	 not	 up	 to	 the	 job	…	 if	 they	 can	 say	 to	 anybody	 that	 it	 [family	 pressure]	makes	 a	
difference	to	my	judgment,	they	shouldn’t	be	doing	the	job,	they	should’ve	left.	They’re	not	a	
fit	and	proper	Coroner.	Coroner	3	
	
3.	 Coroners	versus	statisticians	
The	 final	 issue	 that	 emerged	 from	 the	 semi‐structured	 interviews	 concerns	 the	
relationship	between	the	Coronial	suicide	inquest	and	the	production	of	suicide	data.	It	
is	 clear	 that	 Coroners	 feel	 no	 obligation	 to	 make	 their	 findings	 amenable	 to	 the	
production	 of	 useful	 suicide	 statistics.	 Most	 regard	 their	 task	 as	 a	 fundamentally	
administrative	function	concerning	the	management	of	particular	kinds	of	death	as	well	
as	helping	families,	where	possible,	deal	with	the	passing	of	a	loved	one;	however,	they	
do	 not	 see	 their	 job	 as	 facilitating	 the	 recording	 of	 such	 deaths	 into	 meaningful	
numbers:		
	
The	statisticians	will	try	and	drill	down,	and	sometimes	we’ll	get	psychological	surveys	of	my	
files	…	 they	 go	 through	 and	 the	 try	 and	 figure	 out	what	 the	 file	means	 so	 they	 get	 the	 true	
suicide	picture.	So	I	said;	‘Hang	on	a	second;	I	sit	in	court,	I’ve	heard	the	evidence,	I’ve	made	a	
judgment	on	what’s	happening	here,	and	you	want	to	go	through	the	same	material	 to	see	 if	
you	come	to	the	same	judgment	or	a	different	judgment?	They	said	‘Yeah’.	‘That’s	fine,’	I	said,	
‘what	you’re	doing	is	meaningless,	but	just	do	it	if	you	want	to.’	Coroner	3	
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We’ve	now	introduced	narrative	verdicts	which	are	here	to	stay	as	far	as	I’m	concerned,	and	
are	 a	 huge	 boon	 for	 the	 public,	 and	 a	 huge	 benefit	 to	 the	 Coroner’	 court.	 So	 I’m	 not	 very	
sympathetic	 to	 somebody	 coming	 along	 and	 saying:	 ‘well,	 you’re	 disturbing	 our	 statistics’.	
Coroner	6	
	
Those	 Coroners	 who	 place	 greater	 weight	 than	 others	 upon	 the	 non‐administrative	
elements	 of	 their	 job	 –	 that	 is,	 those	 who	 emphasise	 a	 more	 pastoral	 approach	 to	
running	 an	 inquest	 –	 appear	 to	 have	 less	 concern	 for	 the	 difficulties	 faced	 by	 those	
coding	statistical	data	for	later	interpretation:		
	
You	know,	I	do	the	job	as	I	think	fit,	and	by	trying	to	put	families	first.	I	think	I’m	as	guilty	as	
anyone	sometimes	of	being	a	softy.	I	appreciate	that	it	must	rankle	statisticians	completely,	but	
in	terms	of	perhaps	the	way	people	can	live	with	themselves	thereafter,	I	think	that	probably	is	
a	better	aim.	Coroner	4	
	
You	can	make	a	difference	because	one	of	 the	non‐statutory	functions	which	 is	not	recorded	
anywhere	 but	 a	 lot	 of	 us	 do	 it,	 is	 to	 try	 and	 help	 the	 family	 in	 closure,	 without	 being	
paternalistic.	It	can	be	a	cathartic	exercise	and	to	that	extent	I	think	you’ve	justified	your	own	
existence,	never	mind	the	State’s	work	which	you	do.	Coroner	5	
	
Two	 issues	 emerge	 from	 this	 observation.	 First,	 by	 adopting	 this	 approach,	 Coroner’s	
become	–	consciously	or	otherwise	–	the	principal	gatekeepers	of	our	suicide	statistics.	
In	deciding	which	deaths	are	recorded	as	suicides,	often	for	reasons	above	and	beyond	
the	 ontology	 of	 the	 deaths	 themselves,	 Coroners	 can	 ultimately	 determine	 whether	
suicide	rates	are	increasing	or	decreasing,	based	not	upon	the	specifics	of	each	case	but,	
rather,	upon	their	perceived	responsibility	to	grieving	families,	with	all	the	concomitant	
implication	this	may	have	for	suicide	prevention	policy	formulation	and	funding.		
	
Continuing	 on	 from	 the	 problems	 and	 observations	 raised	 above,	 the	 second	 issue	
concerns	the	more	important	question	about	the	role	we	expect	Coroners	to	play	within	
social	governance.	Are	Coroners	the	most	important	cog	in	the	administrative	machine	
charged	 with	 recordingthe	 death	 of	 citizens,	 or	 are	 they	 now	 positioned	 as	 an	
appropriate	part	of	the	grieving	process,	providing	important	therapeutic	interventions	
into	the	mental	and	emotional	health	of	 the	community?	One	further	question	 follows	
12 
 
on	 from	 this	 issue:	 are	 these	 two	 roles	mutually	exclusive;	or	 is	 it	possible	 to	 include	
both	within	 a	 broader	understanding	of	 the	 role	 of	 the	Coroner	within	 contemporary	
governance?		
	
The	therapeutic	Coroner	
	
The	 precise	 role	 of	 the	 Coronial	 inquest	 is	 not	 necessarily	 an	 easy	 one	 to	 define.	 As	
previously	 discussed,	 Burney	 (2000)	 has	 articulated	 the	 inquest’s	 function	 within	
modern	democratic	processes	as	not	only	a	check	on	State	abuse	of	power	but	also	as	a	
site	for	new	scientific	truth‐claims	to	be	aired	and	to	gain	momentum.	The	Coroners	in	
this	 study	 themselves	 voiced	 an	 array	 of	 other	 explanations	 as	 to	 its	 ongoing	
importance.	For	example:		
	
Part	of	the	whole	purpose	of	an	inquest	is	to	quell	rumour.	It’s	a	very	old‐fashioned	thing	to	
say,	but	it	is.	Coroner	2	
	
While	this	may	be	true,	arguably	the	fundamental	purpose	of	the	modern	inquest	and,	
by	 extension,	 the	 position	 of	 the	 Coroner	 itself	 has	 now	 been	 subsumed	 within	 the	
general	 governance	 –	 governance	 in	 a	 Foucaultian	 (1977)	 sense	 –	 of	 contemporary	
populations.		
	
Suicide	and	governance	
Towards	the	end	of	the	eighteenth	century,	the	governmental	process	started	whereby	
the	 social	 body	 was	 transformed	 from	 an	 undifferentiated	mob	 into	 a	 workable	 and	
more	readily	governable	population;	one	comprised	of	noticeable	features	and	patterns	
as	 well	 as	 differentiated	 individuals,	 each	 with	 their	 own	 discernible	 capacities	 and	
characteristics.	While	 this	 process	 began	 in	 a	 fairly	modest	way,	 it	 enabled	 disparate	
organs	of	government	to	sketch	out	a	preliminary	map	of	some	of	the	most	 important	
contours	 of	 community	 life.	 These	 contours	 included,	 for	 example,	 how	many	 people	
lived	in	particular	locations,	how	they	were	employed,	how	they	lived,	and	importantly	
for	the	purposes	of	this	paper,	how	long	they	lived,	and	how	they	died	(Tait	2013).	
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Over	the	ensuing	two	hundred	years,	mortality	rates	have	proven	to	be	one	of	the	most	
important	 statistics	 within	 the	 management	 of	 populations,	 principally	 because	 the	
health	of	the	population	had	rapidly	become	one	of	the	central	functions	of	the	exercise	
of	political	power:	 that	 is,	providing	a	social	milieu	that	promised	physical	well‐being,	
health,	and	optimal	longevity.	As	Foucault	(1984:	277)	states:	‘The	imperative	of	health	
…	[is]	at	once	the	duty	of	each	and	the	objective	of	all’.	Consequently,	as	the	nineteenth	
century	progressed,	characterised	by	what	Hacking	(1982)	refers	to	as	‘an	avalanche	of	
printed	numbers’,	it	became	possible	to	know	–	and	important	to	know	–	when	people	
died,	how	they	died,	where	they	died,	and	how	many	died	by	their	own	hand.	After	all,	a	
healthy	population	is	not	a	population	with	a	high	suicide	rate.	Following	this	logic,	the	
issue	of	suicide	became	the	focus	of	immense	concern	towards	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	
century,	culminating	in	the	publication	of	Durkheim’s	seminal	sociological	text,	Suicide	
(1897),	amongst	others.	As	Tierney	(2010:	383)	notes:		
	
…	the	return	of	the	troubling	issue	of	suicide	at	the	turn	of	the	twenty‐first	century	is	just	as	
sociologically	significant	as	the	issue	was	in	the	nineteenth	century,	when	it	first	caught	the	
attention	of	Peuchet,	Marx	and	Durkheim.	 In	 the	context	of	 the	history	of	government	 that	
Foucault	 presented	 his	 courses	 in	 the	 late	 1970s,	 the	 nineteenth‐century	 sociological	
fascination	 with	 suicide	 appears	 as	 part	 of	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 new	 form	 of	 political	
rationality	that	governs	the	conduct	of	individuals	based	upon	the	patterns	and	regularities	
revealed	by	statistical	analyses	of	the	population.		
	
Arguably,	 unless	 such	 statistical	 analyses	 measure	 what	 they	 claim	 to	 measure	 –	
whether	dealing	with	suicide	or	any	of	the	other	problems	which	form	the	raison	d’être	
for	all	programs	of	intervention	–	then	they	defeat	the	fundamental	purpose	of	this	form	
of	 governance.	 This	 leaves	 those	 Coroners	 more	 predisposed	 to	 organising	 their	
findings	in	part	on	the	basis	of	family	wishes,	seemingly	in	an	untenable	position.	That	
is,	 if	 the	 statistics	 their	 actions	 give	 rise	 to	 bear	 only	 a	 passing	 resemblance	 to	 any	
reasonable	approximation	of	actual	occurrences	of	suicide,	perhaps	that	governmental	
responsibility	should	be	dealt	with	elsewhere.		
	
Interestingly,	Marsh	 (2010)	 also	 adopts	 a	 Foucaultian	 approach	 in	 his	 analysis	 of	 the	
governmentalisation	of	suicide.	However,	not	only	does	he	address	the	manner	in	which	
suicide	was	brought	into	the	realm	of	the	knowable,	and	hence	manageable,	he	also	goes	
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on	to	examine	 the	way	 in	which	 this	phenomenon	was	re‐translated	 into	a	matter	 for	
psychiatric	concern,	itself	a	new	form	of	regulation	and	governance.	This	latter	issue	is	
of	no	 little	 importance,	as	 it	may	well	be	argued	that	 the	 ‘therapeutic’	concern	 for	 the	
wellbeing	 of	 the	 grieving	 family	 is	 not	 simply	 antithetical	 to	 the	 management	 of	
contemporary	 populations,	 but	 instead	 represents	 a	 different	 governmental	 tactic,	
deployed	within	the	same	overall	strategy.	
	
Therapeutic	jurisprudence	
The	tension	evidenced	among	the	Coroners	concerning	the	role	of	the	family	in	suicide	
determination	appears	to	be	relatively	new,	as	there	is	little	sign	of	it	in	Burney’s	book	
on	the	English	Coronial	inquest	during	the	late	nineteenth	century	and	early	twentieth	
century	 mentioned	 earlier.	 What	 may	 have	 happened	 here	 are	 the	 effects	 of	 what	
Freckelton	 (2008:	 576)	 refers	 to	 as	 the	 rise	 of	 ‘therapeutic	 jurisprudence’,	 defined	 as	
‘the	study	of	the	role	of	the	law	as	a	therapeutic	agent’.		
	
Within	 this	 approach,	 the	 law	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 set	 of	 codes	 to	 be	 followed	 without	
reflection,	much	 in	 the	manner	of	Legal	Positivism;	such	codes	have	consequences	 for	
all	those	caught	up	in	the	proceedings.	As	such,	legal	institutions	and	those	charged	with	
making	 them	work	 are	 now	 deemed	 to	 have	 some	 responsibility	 for	 the	mental	 and	
emotional	wellbeing	of	all	participants.	King	(2008:	4)	is	quite	explicit	in	his	call	for	an	
increasingly	therapeutic	approach	to	Coronial	practice:	
	
Coroners’	 work	 is	 intimately	 connected	 with	 well‐being	 –	 a	 concern	 of	 therapeutic	
jurisprudence.	Part	 of	 the	 Coroner’s	 role	 is	 to	 determine	whether	 there	 are	 public	health	 or	
safety	issues	arising	out	of	the	death	and	whether	any	action	needs	to	be	taken	to	remedy	any	
problems,	particularly	those	that	may	cause	future	deaths	…	Moreover,	the	dead	person’s	family	
suffer	grief	and,	depending	upon	circumstances	of	the	death,	significant	trauma.	
	
According	to	this	logic,	it	would	be	insufficient	for	a	Coroner	to	reach	a	finding	within	a	
suicide	 inquest	 without	 considering	 how	 this	 finding	 might	 impact	 upon	 those	 left	
behind	by	 the	death.	Coroners	would	no	 longer	be	regarded,	or	regard	 themselves,	as	
mere	 functionaries	 in	 the	process	of	 recording	death	 statistics,	 but	 rather	 they	would	
have	a	therapeutic	role	to	play	in	the	emotional	and	psychological	health	of	their	wider	
communities.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 the	 trauma	 of	 losing	 a	 loved	 one	 can	 never	 be	
15 
 
exacerbated	 by	 being	 told	 the	 truth	 about	 it,	 but	 it	 does	 suggest	 that	 the	 Coroners’	
responsibilities	lie	beyond	simply	determining	the	cause	and	circumstances	of	death.	As	
Freckelton	(2008:	577)	states:	
	
Therapeutic	jurisprudence	…	is	in	part	a	practical	orientation	towards	minimizing	adverse	
outcomes.	And	it	 is	 in	part	about	working	with	the	realities	of	the	broad	repercussions	of	
the	law	to	fashion	them	as	constructively	a	possible.		
	
At	 first	 glance,	 the	 apparent	 disregard	 held	 by	 some	 Coroners	 for	 the	 overtly	
administrative	 aspects	 of	 their	 post	 –	 the	 effective	 sketching	 out	 of	 the	 contours	 of	
community	 life;	numbers	and	types	of	deaths	being	a	very	 important	contour	–	raises	
questions	about	just	what	Coroners’	functions	ought	to	be,	and	how	these	functions	can	
be	placed	in	relation	to	each	other.	
	
Binaries	of	governance	
The	 evidence	 suggests	 that,	 rather	 than	 simply	managing	 the	data	 of	 death,	 Coroners	
now	form	part	of	the	governance	of	a	more	subtle	component	of	the	population’s	health	
and	welfare:	 that	of	 subjective	 experience.	That	 is,	particularly	on	 the	 issue	of	 suicide,	
they	now	appear	to	be	a	component	of	the	administrative	apparatus	that	manages	the	
emotional	wellbeing	 of	 the	 population.	Marsh	 (2010)	 noted	 that	 suicide	was	 brought	
into	 the	 realm	 of	 the	 statistically	 knowable,	 and	 from	 there	 pathologised	 as	 an	
unfortunate	 outcome	 of	 mental	 disorder.	 This	 is	 not	 a	 unique	 phenomenon	 but	 is	
instead	an	increasingly	familiar	tactic	for	the	effective	governance	of	subjectivity	(Tait:	
1993;	2010).		
	
However,	while	‘mental	illness’	now	constitutes	one	of	the	central	indicators	of	a	likely	
suicide,	 it	 by	 no	 means	 constitutes	 the	 full	 extent	 of	 the	 role	 played	 by	 the	 psy‐
disciplines	within	 the	 field	 of	 suicide	determination,	 a	 fact	 attested	 to	by	 the	 concern	
shown	by	Coroners	 for	 those	 left	behind.	Rose	(1990:	1)	notes	that	 the	contemporary	
government	of	the	self/subjectivity	has	a	number	of	components,	all	of	which	speak	to	
the	management	of	grieving	families.	First,	the	subjective	capacities	of	citizens	are	now	
integral	 to	 the	 workings	 of	 public	 powers,	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	 extensive	 welfare	
apparatus	 targeting	 the	 psychological	 health	 of	 the	 population.	 Second,	 it	 is	 now	 an	
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expectation	 that	modern	organisations	 (which	would	 include	 the	Coronial	 courts)	 are	
charged	with	the	task	of	managing	subjectivity;	as	such,	it	would	no	longer	be	deemed	
appropriate	for	Coroner’s	to	simply	ignore	the	emotional	wellbeing	of	families.	Finally,	
new	 forms	 of	 expertise	 have	 emerged	 pertaining	 to	 the	 government	 of	 subjectivity.	
Arguably,	 these	 new	 forms	 of	 expertise	 have	 clustered	 together	 in	what	 Rose	 (1990)	
refers	 to	 as	 a	 ‘therapeutic	 community’;	 it	 may	 well	 be	 the	 case	 that	 Coroners	 have	
allocated	themselves	a	role	within	that	community.		
	
From	the	evidence	emerging	from	the	observations	at	inquest	and	from	the	interviews	
with	 the	 Coroners,	 it	 appears	 that	 the	 Coroners	 have	 a	 significant	 part	 to	 play	 in	 the	
traditional	 governance	 of	 suicide	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 the	 recording	 of	 death	 and	 the	
management	of	data.	However,	 it	 appears	 that	many	of	 the	Coroners	 feel	a	 social	and	
professional	obligation	within	the	practices	of	emotional	governance.	While	it	is	evident	
that	 these	 two	 functions	 do	 not	 necessarily	 sit	 easily	 alongside	 each	 other,	 it	 is	
important	 to	 avoid	 describing	 Coronial	 suicide	 inquests	 as	 some	 kind	 of	 relatively	
unsuccessful	 attempt	 at	 achieving	 a	 unitary	 governmental	 task:	 that	 of	 unfailingly	
accurate	suicide	determination.	Likewise,	it	is	also	important	not	to	construct	some	kind	
of	 simplistic	 governmental	 binary	 between	 the	 administrative	 and	 the	 therapeutic,	
where	none	necessarily	exists.		
	
In	 his	 book	 on	 education,	Hunter	 (1994:	 xxii)	 notes	 that	 attempts	 to	 ascribe	 singular	
function	to	the	modern	school	–	that	of	developing	fully‐reasoned	individuals	–	ignores	
the	complex	relationship	between	its	bureaucratic	components,	and	its	 long	history	of	
pastoral	guidance.		
	
There	is	no	ideal	or	complete	development	of	the	person	underlying	the	school	system	…	the	
school	system	is	a	highly	impure,	tactically	improvised	institution,	assembled	from	different	
spheres	of	life	and	serving	a	mixture	of	spiritual	and	worldly	ends.	
	
The	English	Coronial	inquest	appears	to	have	equally	complex	relationships	between	its	
bureaucratic,	 its	 democratic,	 its	 scientific	 and,	 latterly,	 its	 pastoral	 functions,	
relationships	that	have	yet	to	be	fully,	or	even	partially,	resolved.	It	would	consequently	
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be	 overly‐simplistic	 to	 place	 concerns	 over	 Coronial	 suicide	 determination	 within	 a	
dichotomous	governmental	problematic.	
	
Conclusion	
	
This	study	leads	to	three	central	observations.	First,	given	the	evidence	assembled	here,	
if	 the	English	inquest	 is	any	measure	of	the	idiosyncratic	and	locally‐organised	way	in	
which	potential	suicides	are	addressed	and	adjudicated	upon,	then	comparative	suicide	
statistics	(both	local	and	international)	are	likely	to	be	inherently	problematic.	Without	
following	 the	 positivist	 suggestion	 that	 there	 can	 be	 an	 objective	 truth	 of	 suicide	
statistics,	 that	 we	 can	 somehow	 come	 to	 know,	 it	 is	 still	 possible	 to	 argue	 that	 the	
‘truths’	 produced	 through	 current	 statistical	 and	 administrative	 calculation	 should	 be	
subject	 to	 more	 effective	 reorganisation	 and	 refinement.	 Governance,	 after	 all,	 is	 a	
continually	failing	operation	(Rose	and	Miller	1992),	and	while	it	may	be	impossible	to	
be	ontologically	‘right’,	there	are	thousands	of	ways	of	being	wrong.		
	
Second,	while	the	English	Coroners	expressed	near	unanimous	support	for	the	stringent	
standard	 of	 proof	 required	 (in	 spite	 of	 the	 statistical	 inaccuracies	 this	most	 certainly	
produces),	and	unanimous	support	for	the	continued	existence	of	a	compulsory	inquest	
for	 all	 potential	 deaths	 by	 suicide,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 few	 advantages	 in	 Australia	
adopting	the	same	protocols	and	procedures.	The	only	argument	that	could	run	counter	
to	this	would	involve	a	greater	emphasis	upon	therapeutic	models	of	Coronial	practice,	
which	would	 lean	 towards	 emphasising	 the	 benefits	 of	 suicide	 inquests	 in	 aiding	 the	
grieving	 process	 of	 bereaved	 families.	 Given	 the	 problems	 outlined	 above,	 and	 given	
Australia	has	no	historical	expectation	of	an	 inquest,	 let	alone	 the	high	costs	 involved	
and	 the	 extra	workload	placed	upon	 that	 nation’s	 already	 taxed	 Coroners,	 this	 seems	
highly	unlikely.		
	
Finally,	the	important	question	arises:	what	is	the	principal	role	of	the	inquest	in	suicide	
investigations?	 There	 seems	 to	 be	 little	 agreement	 among	 the	 English	 Coroners	
interviewed.	 While	 most	 understand	 and	 accept	 their	 role	 within	 the	 governmental	
regulation	of	death,	 this	often	seemed	secondary	to	their	 less	tangible	pastoral	role	 in	
helping	the	families	deal	with	bereavement.	Still,	it	must	be	stated	this	is	not	an	invalid	
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or	 inappropriate	 role	 for	 Coroners	 to	 have	 adopted;	 such	management	 of	 community	
emotional	wellbeing	constitutes	an	important	function	of	governance,	and	Coroners	are	
as	 well	 placed	 as	 any	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 process.	 However,	 the	 disagreement	 and	
relative	confusion	over	 their	 responsibilities	may	eventually	need	 formal	 clarification,	
especially	 since,	 as	 it	 stands,	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 therapeutic	 components	 of	 the	 position	
appears	 to	be	 impacting	on	 the	ability	of	 some	Coroners	 to	 fulfill	 their	administrative	
responsibility	 to	 the	 full.	 Given	 the	 importance	 of	 suicide	 statistics,	 this	may	 require	
significant	clarification.		
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i	This	study	constitutes	a	pilot	study	for	a	large,	comparative	study	between	English	and	
Australian	 Coronial	 practice	 regarding	 suicide	 determination.	 The	 research	 was	
conducted	within	one	geographic	area	within	England;	 it	consisted	of	 two	parts.	First,	
observations	were	made	at	20	public	inquests	into	possible	suicides.	Contact	was	made	
with	 each	 Coronial	 Office,	 which	 then	 suggested	 which	 inquests	 to	 attend.	 All	 the	
20 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
inquests	were	within	the	same	part	of	England;	they	were	conducted	over	a	four	month	
period,	some	lasting	two	days,	some	lasting	 less	than	an	hour;	most	took	between	3‐4	
hours.	The	 inquests	attended	 reached	a	variety	of	different	 conclusions	 in	addition	 to	
suicide,	including	accident,	open	verdicts,	and	narrative	verdicts.	The	second	part	of	the	
research	 involved	 semi‐structured	 interviews,	 which	 were	 informed	 by	 observation	
made	at	the	inquests.	These	were	conducted	with	six	coroners	who	had	presided	over	
the	above	inquests.	Once	again,	all	were	from	the	same	part	of	England.	The	interviews	
were	conducted	over	a	two	month	period;	generally,	they	lasted	about	an	hour,	and	they	
were	conducted	in	a	variety	of	locations.		
 
ii	The	transcripts	were	coded	and	analysed	by	the	authors	with	particular	attention	to	
recurring	themes.	
 
